Introduction
Links between poverty and crime are strengthened by early experiences of childhood poverty, and the rapidity and intensity of poverty experiences, and whether these experiences are prolonged or short lived. Living in poverty makes offending and being the victim of a property or violent crime much more likely. And yet, education, welfare, housing and labour market reforms over decades have systematically worsened the social and economic conditions of poor, single young men. Impoverishing a group already prone to criminality and criminalisation, reforms have pushed young men into the margins of the licit and illicit economy, further marginalising them. Their impoverishment and marginalisation has been a central feature of long-term and growing crime trends.
Modest improvements in their employment situation since the mid-1990s, followed by relatively muted poverty increases in the post-2008 recession, compared to previous recessions, partly ensured that crime continued to decline. Subsequent austerity policies have again marginalised this group.
Since the 2008 recession, young single men living in poor areas have seen the most rising hardship. The article argues that successive governments have been unwise to neglect the poverty of unemployed and underemployed, single young men into young adulthood. Their comparatively unfavourable treatment (as the most 'undeserving' of the 'undeserving poor') has impoverished a group renowned for being crime-prone, making it more likely they find 'solutions' to their poverty in crime.
The article furthers conclusions from our comprehensive review of the evidence about the impact of poverty on crime commissioned by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (Webster and Kingston 2014a) . A repeated pattern emerged from this review that pointed to the poverty effects on working class young people of long-term policy changes in welfare, housing and employment. This relationship between growing youth poverty and policy took a turn for the worse with growing youth unemployment from the 1970s. We believe that the history of this relationship in Britain shows an adverse and cumulative effect from 1980 to the present.
The article argues from this broad approach that the worsening of young people's social conditions resulted from their cumulative and systematic impoverishment over the whole period. In profoundly changing their routes to independence poor young men's criminal involvement was inadvertently hastened and encouraged. The article asks why then, if poverty and crime rates among poor young men are so aligned, why crime has continued to 3 decline in the recent period while poverty increased after the 2008 recession.
The article concludes with a discussion about the prospects of poor young men and their involvement in crime under 'austerity'. The considerable ground covered, reflects the articles origins in a wide ranging historical review of evidence linking poverty and crime, and the strengthening of this relationship found over time for some groups of young men. Overall, in cataloguing increasingly punitive welfare and work policies targeting poor young men, policy is revealed to be malign.
The evidence linking poverty and crime
Sometimes popular and academic parlance agree that those who live in poverty are more likely to be the victim of crime and offend. After all, in Britain the majority of those arrested and imprisoned have experienced poverty. At other times thinking has strongly contested the idea that poverty alone in some straightforward way causes crime on the basis that most poor people are law abiding and eschew law breaking. We reviewed the academic research delineating the nature of the supposed relationship between poverty and crime, the mechanisms involved, and the groups effected. From this we concluded that although the relationship between poverty and crime is not always direct, living in poverty makes offending and being the victim of crime much more likely. We were struck by how regularly the most crime prone group are poor single young men. Despite their susceptibility to crime we were also struck by their worsening conditions and 4 impoverishment as a group over much of the last thirty five years Kingston 2014a, 2014b) . As economic recessions became more frequent, youth poverty and unemployment grew in intensity and duration. The growing research interest in the impact of poverty on crime was able to capture, with the benefit of hindsight and the application of longitudinal perspectives, hitherto unknown levels, longevity and concentrations of poverty and crime relationships. Studies of this relationship occurring among cohorts who had experienced poverty whilst growing up in earlier periods tended to conclude that the impact of poverty on crime was weaker than studies conducted over later periods. There was something about the quantity and quality of poverty experiences that had changed leading to the likelihood of more adverse, anti-social poverty outcomes such as delinquency and crime.
Earlier studies of the impact of poverty on crime among children and young adults growing up before the onset of mass youth unemployment usually found an inconclusive or weak relationship between poverty and crime (Tittle and Meier 1990 , Sampson and Laub 1993 , Wright et al 1999 , Tittle et al 1978 , Tittle 1983 , Rutter and Giller 1983 . The first studies to capture the emergence of mass youth unemployment and poverty during the 1980s and early 1990s, found that violent and property crime were associated with absolute and relative poverty and economic inequality (Kawachi et al, 1999; Kennedy et al, 1998; Messner, 1989) . These studies were more likely to find a strong and 5 direct relationship between poverty and offending, particularly the impact of childhood poverty and the effects of growing up poor on later persistent youth offending (Braithwaite, 1981; Jarjoura et al 2002; Hay and Forrest, 2009; Bjerk, 2007) .
Longitudinal approaches followed children growing up in poverty finding that adverse family, individual, school, and peer factors, associated with poverty, increased individual susceptibility to crime. The longer a young person lives in poverty the more likely they are to engage in delinquent behaviour (Fergusson et al 2004 , Wright et al 1999 , Jarjoura et al 2002 . It is the longevity and recurrence of poverty that adversely influences family processes causing disruption and emotional stress. Long-term poverty influences the resources and therefore opportunities available to children and young people and their emotional security, and has the strongest impact on criminal involvement (Skardhamar 2009 , Bottoms et al 2004 . Crises of unemployment during economic recessions polarizes the poor into offenders and nonoffenders, felt most severely by those with the lowest level of resources and the most structural constraints due to their criminal involvement (Nilsson et al 2013 , Verbruggen et al 2012 , Hallsten et al 2013 , Bottoms et al 2004 . Finally, economic recession and mass unemployment concentrate crime spatially. Poverty remains the most important and direct influence on neighbourhood 6 violent crime, and poverty rather than neighbourhood cohesion has the strongest relationship with crime rates (Hooghe et al 2011 , Bruinsma et al 2013 , and Sutherland et al 2013 . Indeed the most striking and consistent relationship between poverty and crime across many different settings is that poverty predicts area homicide rates (Pridemore 2011) .
Impoverishing young men
The growing interest in the impact of poverty on crime emerged around 1980 at a time of unprecedented increases in poverty and unemployment, accompanied by steep rises in the crime rate. As we have seen, studies were more interested in whether unemployment and poverty caused or correlated with crime in a general sense, rather than with identifying the particular social The Wolverhampton Study (Willis 1988: xix) , based on a survey and interviews with young people, concluded, There are a few 'deserving' poor and they have to be helped. But there is something else in mind for the 'undeserving' poor -which certainly includes the young unemployed. They must be forced into work motivation and work discipline and be made accustomed to poverty level pay in order to supply the ready, cheap workforce necessary for local economic revival. Recipients of welfare must be willing to demonstrate their moral fibre (work readiness) by undertaking some make work job or apparent training in order to receive their 'pay'.
Coercive measures targeted the young unemployed seen in the withdrawal of benefit for all under 18s; a compulsion to attend Youth Training for two years; the lowering of Benefit rates for the under 25s and the withdrawal of special payments; the drastic curtailment of rent and rate rebates; compulsory six monthly job interviews for the unemployed with loss of benefit for those not attending; and the removal of the right to attend Further Education for up to 21 hours without losing benefit. All these reforms deliberately aimed to impoverish unemployed young men. Blame for growing youth poverty was placed on the failure of their families to support them (Walker 2014) . By lowering their income support and raising their contributions to family rent costs, independent living for this group became difficult if not impossible (Hill and Walker 2014) . Until 1985 youth poverty was the result of an explosion in youth unemployment. After 1985 youth poverty and homelessness was due largely to government policies and 1987 saw the start of more radical changes (Hill and Walker 2014, Farrall and Jennings 2014) . Earlier losses of income support and housing benefits for 16-and 17-year-old claimants, and reductions for 18-24-year-old, were compounded by the 1988 Social Security Act, which increased homelessness amongst those aged 16-18, and corralled poor young people together in 'sink estates' (Carlen 1996, Farrall and Jennings 2014) . When Unemployment Benefit was re-titled Jobseeker's Allowance in 1995, the rate was lowered again for those under 25-years-old. Difficulties were particularly sharp where their families of origin do not have the financial means to support young adults or they are estranged from their families. These conditions are particularly likely to occur amongst those with a significant history of adolescent offending, who will inevitably often find themselves looking for accommodation in the shrinking 'social housing' sector (Farrall et al 2010) . Even when education was taken into account a penalty attached to poverty in childhood remained and increased over time (Bynner 2002) . Early schoolleavers have been marginalised as traditional craft apprenticeships for young men have been largely replaced by service sector occupations (hospitality, catering and caring) often part-time and on relatively low pay. They are worse off and comparably poorer compared with the situation of young people 25 years earlier. In addition, the earnings of young people, relative to those aged over 25 years, have declined dramatically over the period (Bynner 2002) .
Poor young men's changing routes to independence

Why has crime declined while poverty increased?
We have established that unemployment and poverty is positively and strongly associated with the rate of acquisitive crime in Britain, and elsewhere, and that virtually all recent studies find a strong relationship between dramatic increases in inequality, poverty and violent crime. Previous and with the arrival of the Coalition's 'austerity' policies that conditions for the poor became much harder (see Schui, 2014; Blyth, 2013) . Finally, the inextricable thread linking policy towards youth poverty over the past thirty five years is still the problem of youth unemployment. There has however, There will continue to be stricter administration of many out-of-work benefits, including much greater use of 'sanctions' imposed on unemployed and other claimants for not meeting particular job-search requirements (Hills 2015) . Meanwhile, the recently elected Conservative government still faces a weak system of apprenticeships for young people and relatively ineffective mechanisms for helping workless people back into work. We saw how the Coalition's supply side measures in the labour market represented evolution rather than revolution. Labour's 'welfare to work' programme was reformed, but the aims remained similar (McKnight and Hills 2015) .
Overall, work, welfare and criminal justice policies that fall particularly harshly upon poor young men have required them to behave in a certain way to access welfare cash benefits, housing or support services. Enforced through penalties or 'sanctions' that reduce, suspend or end access to these goods, behavioural requirements are now used much more frequently, and their severity have increased, particularly in respect of out-of-work-benefits. Benefit sanctions are having a strongly disproportionate effect on poor young people under 25, and there is also evidence of severe impacts on homeless people and other vulnerable groups. This enlargement of the scope and range of behaviours covered, particularly in relation to Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB), social housing and homelessness, has led Watts et al (2014) to conclude that any benefits in terms of improvements to street-based lifestyles and ASB, may be offset by the hardship faced by those failing to meet behavioural conditions.
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While the Labour Government's tax and benefit reforms and policies towards poverty since 1997 reduced child poverty and benefited parents with children, poverty rates for working-age adults without children had reached record levels by 2002/03 (Hills and Stewart 2004) . Meanwhile poor young people today face the same difficulties finding employment as they experienced in the past. The continuities with the past are perhaps most clearly seen in the Prime Minister's proposal to remove entitlement to housing benefit for all people aged 16-24, subsequently amending this for unemployed people aged 18 to 21 only, inevitably increasing poverty and homelessness for this group. Similarly, at the time of writing, the current Conservative government are to make sure that unemployed 18-to 21-yearolds will have to claim a youth allowance under the Full Employment and Welfare Benefits Bill, with strict conditionality. After six months, they will have to start an apprenticeship or training to continue to receive money. As MacDonald (2011) has argued in respect of policy towards the problem of youth unemployment and underemployment since 1980, 'Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose'. The young in general, and this group in particular, now face the most precarious future as youth unemployment rose at twice the average rate through the financial crisis and during 2014 stood at three times the national average. In 2014 some 950,000 young people aged [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] were not only unemployed but also not in education or training (Lansley and Mack 2015) .
20
Discussion and conclusion
Begun around 1980 reforms over thirty five years in the areas of education and training, welfare, housing and the labour market policy have had consistently and systematically adverse effects on single teenage and young adult men without children living in poor areas. As worrying levels of youth unemployment began to appear after 1977 this group occupied places and times where crime and murder rates more than doubled, unemployment soared, and 'poverty drugs' became endemic (Thompson 2014, MacDonald and Marsh, 2005) . Turning to poor, young, childless, working class men, policy and popular fears have engendered the group as the most undeserving of the poor. Of course, other social groups have suffered disproportionate poverty too -and the sort of vilification reserved for poor young men -most notably lone parents (Hills and Stewart 2004) . It is the relentlessness with which poor young men have seen their poverty worsen and its alleviation fade over thirty five years that is striking. In worsening poor young men's social and economic conditions, policies have exposed them to criminal temptations and opportunities that might otherwise not have existed. Instead of preventing and alleviating their poverty, policies have hastened and deepened it. In this sense they are the most 'undeserving' and 'punished' of the able-bodied poor (Wacquant 2009 ). 
